Significant Issues Regarding the Fourth Year of Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine 

By: William Richer (Research Analyst, Team Europe), Jacob Tuckey (Research Analyst, Team Europe), and Thomas Cline-Fedorus (Senior Research Analyst, Team Europe Lead)

Executive Summary

These issues include the ongoing attacks on energy infrastructure, the developing economic effects on both the Ukrainian and Russian economies, drone warfare, the abduction of Ukrainian children, and other war crimes. In the portion on energy infrastructure, William Richer will discuss the Russian systematic targeting of Ukrainian energy infrastructure and Ukraine’s ability to repair its energy infrastructure. Richer will also discuss Ukraine’s retaliation against Russian oil and gas infrastructure. In the portion on the effects on both the Ukrainian and Russian economies, Jacob Tuckey will discuss how Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has impacted the Ukrainian economy, economic aid to Ukraine, how sanctions have affected Russia’s economy, and how Russia has adapted its economy to circumvent the sanctions. Regarding drone warfare, Richer will discuss how drones have dramatically changed warfare and the usage of technology in war. In the portion on Ukrainian children, Thomas Cline-Fedorus will discuss the systematic Russian abduction of Ukrainian children, the re-education of Ukrainian children, Russia’s militarization of Ukrainian children, and Russia’s torture of Ukrainian children. Regarding other war crimes, excluding attacks on energy infrastructure, Cline-Fedorus discusses gender-based violence, conflict-related sexual violence, Russia’s torture of prisoners of war, Russia’s summary execution of its own soldiers, Ukraine’s detention of Ukrainian citizens on charges related to treason and espionage, Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, and Russia’s looting and the erasing of Ukrainian culture. In the portion regarding internal and external displacement, Cline-Fedorus will discuss the internal and external displacement of Ukrainian civilians. This includes how it has affected the health of the Ukrainian population, vulnerable groups such as women, children, elderly individuals, and LGBTQIA+ individuals, and the risks of conflict-related sexual violence due to the internal and external displacement. 

Energy Infrastructure

Since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian armed forces have systemically targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to hinder the Ukrainian government’s war efforts and decrease civilian morale. Already in the first months of the war, heavy fighting in the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Mykolaiv regions resulted in likewise heavy damage to gas and electricity networks. Regular shelling and drone strikes on civilian energy infrastructure, especially during winter, have been part of Moscow’s strategy to force Ukrainian leaders to agree with Russian peace terms. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure had been particularly vulnerable since the country inherited a system from the Soviet era that was integrated with and dependent on Russia’s energy infrastructure. Russia weaponized Ukraine’s dependence on its energy infrastructure and interdependence with Russian energy and its own infrastructure put Ukraine’s energy security at risk. Ukraine has sought increased integration and imports with the European Union to lower prices and increase energy security and reliance, as well as maintain its economy. Nevertheless, Ukraine has proven efficient at repairing, updating, and expanding its grid. Furthermore, to strengthen its energy resilience, the country has decentralized renewable energy, notably with solar and wind power local storage systems, to keep essential services running and homes heated during winter. Supported by European programs, Ukraine wants to increase its renewable energy production as it proves harder for Russian forces to disrupt, mainly because infrastructure is located sparsely and more easily and quickly repaired than larger power stations. Russia’s attacks on energy infrastructure, such as power plants, gas facilities, and heating systems, have deprived millions of civilians of heat and electricity, as well as hindered emergency services to civilian populations, which, under international law, can be considered unlawful. Since the start of 2026, Ukraine said Russia attacked the energy grid 217 times. Russian armed forces have coincided their attacks with winter, aiming to use freezing temperatures and decreased access to power for heating and, indeed, for essential services such as hospitals and water systems, primarily for Ukrainian civilians. The targeting of energy infrastructure has created an economic gap for Ukrainians. Prices rose, and energy companies are facing debt that will limit investments and repairs while expanding power generation with new facilities. 

Russia is not the only belligerent to target energy infrastructure. Ukraine has retaliated and stepped up its drone and missile strikes on oil refineries, fuel depots, pumping stations, pipeline infrastructure, and export hubs. By October 2025, over half of the 38 major refineries in Russia had been targeted, and 10 to 15% of Russia’s refining capacity was disabled momentarily. Ukrainian strikes have also reached further into Russian territory on facilities in cities such as Volgograd, Novokuibyshev, Ryazan, Saratov, and Salavat. The Russian paper Kommersant has reported a 10% fall in gasoline output, which combines with temporary reductions in refining capacities. Sustained and bigger drone strikes in number, reach, and payload could prove hard for Russia to defend against with sparse air defences. Ukraine has claimed that, unlike Russia, its drone strikes on Russian energy infrastructures do not aim to disrupt civilian lives but rather to cripple Moscow’s war revenue streams and fuel military logistics. Ukraine has, in 2025, carried out more than 160 strikes against oil production and oil refineries. Though Russia maintains a high oil production and refining capacity, increased Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure may raise the cost of war for Moscow with higher fuel prices and domestic pressures to stabilize markets. However, Ukraine may have to be more selective and restrained in carrying out attacks. Recent strikes on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) oil export terminal near Novorossiysk also carry Kazakh oil and are vital to Kazakhstan and Western companies operating there. Though it also carries Russian oil, it affects allies and foreign investors and could boost Russia’s attempts to find buyers of its oil in India, China, and Türkiye. 

Impact on the Ukrainian Economy 

From the end of the Soviet era, the Ukrainian economy had experienced tumultuous growth. Though the country had inherited a sizeable industrial base from the USSR, the transition to a market economy in the 1990s had proven itself difficult. Sore points included a lack of modern banking infrastructure and poor performance of firms in global markets. Corruption also remained a significant issue, as privatization efforts consolidated state assets in the hands of oligarchs. Though stability eventually came in the 2000s, the global financial crisis worsened conditions, slowing Ukraine’s economic development to a halt in 2014. 

Following the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine signed an Association Agreement with the European Union, which enshrined greater economic integration and political alignment with its Member States. Trade ties were further expanded with the introduction of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area in 2016. However, the illegal annexation of Crimea and ongoing conflict with Russian proxies in the Donbas had undermined investor confidence in Ukraine, hampering progress towards its growth goals. Though European and Chinese trade would fill the void left by Moscow, the shift in trade ties was far from seamless.  

By early 2022, the Ukrainian economy continued to battle structural weaknesses despite continued harmonization with EU member states. Its GDP in 2021 was approximately $200 billion, with its leading sectors including agriculture, machinery, and mineral extraction. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion inflicted severe damage, precipitating a near-30% decline in GDP from lost and damaged industrial capacity, labour disruptions, and more.  Millions of Ukrainian citizens are displaced, manufacturing capacity is degraded, and casualties caused a decline in human capital. Ukraine’s agricultural transport infrastructure was also damaged, with a Russian blockade on grain exports threatening food security abroad until the UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative was enacted in July 2022. Despite the suspension of the agreement in late 2023, grain exports from Ukraine continue their transit through an established Black Sea corridor. 

Amid the full-scale war, economic aid to Ukraine has given the country a lifeline, permitting the continued operation of public services and limited returns to commercial activity. Supplementing continued payment of pensions, essential services and more, aid packages permitted Kyiv to bridge the shortfall in tax revenue from lost territories and intense budget expansion. From 2022 to 2024, the United States provided tens of billions in both military and economic aid to help sustain the Ukrainian state. EU member states also emerged as major donors, recently committing to medium-term aid of $105 billion (EUR 90 billion) in addition to new IMF support of $8.1 billion in 2026. The devaluation of the Ukrainian Hryvnia also assisted in easing fiscal pressure and shoring up export revenues. 

As a result, the Ukrainian economy saw a modest recovery from 2023 to 2024 despite escalating violence, avoiding expected economic collapse. In both years, the country posted averages of 5% and 3% annual GDP growth, respectively. Defence spending accounts for a significant portion of this growth, as the transition to a war economy stimulated investment in drone technology and ammunition production. It is expected that Ukraine will emerge as a major player in the European defence industry as large firms take an interest in commercializing battlefield knowledge. 

However, as Russia’s invasion continues, questions remain as to whether the existing economic strategy is sustainable. Continued investment in defence is unlikely to replace previous civilian output, and damaged infrastructure from continuous Russian strikes degrades Ukraine’s capacity in other sectors over time. In several regions, damaged soil is projected to limit harvest potential due to pollution and landmines, which bodes poorly for an agriculture-driven economy. Further, targeting of energy infrastructure will limit the ability of commercial users to draw power until extensive repairs can be completed and guaranteed. The Trump administration’s uncertain position has placed further stress on Ukraine as it becomes more dependent on its other allied investments to survive. Packaged with demographic stressors, the Ukrainian economy is unlikely to sustain its current trajectory in the future. 

Reconstruction of the Ukrainian Economy 

As the war continues into its fifth year, prospects of reconstruction remain stymied by uncertainty. Currently valued at $588 billion, the task of reconstruction faces three key obstacles: wartime degradation, fragility of a ceasefire, and investor pessimism. Demographic changes in Ukraine and tensions associated with a negotiated peace starkly affect its economic outlook. Millions of people are displaced, infrastructure is damaged nationwide, and prolonged conflict renders the estimation of workforce development difficult. Growing population decline and lack of access to the Donbas industrial heartland, if not retaken, will also affect economic prospects.  

Further, though limited negotiations proceed tenuously, the violence remains unimpeded. Russian forces continue to push into Eastern Ukraine, consolidating their hold over four territories formally annexed in September 2022. Should the conflict be frozen along current battle lines, investment into nearby projects will carry risk, potentially dissuading private capital if peace is fragile. Should Russia refuse to pay reparations, this leaves only public or heavily insured investment from Western countries as an alternative. Though the prospect of funding reconstruction is not opposed, the division of investment might prove a contested issue in a political climate rife with populism. 

Sanctions on the Russian Economy 

Though the economic impact associated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been stark for both belligerents, it has also reshaped the use of sanctions and trade pressure in the conflict. Owing to the rise of economic leverage in the post-Cold War era, it can be argued that the conflict exhibits the most consequential use of sanctions tools since the Iraq War, seeking to cripple the world’s tenth-largest economy. Though sanctions were historically wielded against rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, and Eritrea, the degree of economic interdependence between European states and Russian industry posed new challenges.  

From Russia’s first incursion into Crimea in 2014, Western countries have attempted to pressure the Putin regime through use of economic sanctions. These were often tightened following major Russia-linked incidents such as the poisoning of Sergei Skripal or naval skirmishes in the Kerch Strait. Seeking to avoid undermining European economic security through sectoral sanctions, the EU preferred to instead pressure Russian power brokers and firms with direct involvement in the violence. Politicians, oligarchs, military leaders and more were thus targeted with bans on travel, business dealings and investment from 2014 onward. Later rounds of sanctions by Western nations instituted export controls on energy equipment and dual-use technology, as well as barring transactions with major Russian financial institutions. This iterative approach continued through to 2021, where Russia followed through on its near decade of aggression and launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

By 2022, sanctions against Russia had been effective in slowing its growth, but its petrochemical-driven economy largely remained operational. Up to this point, European imports and pipeline construction had buoyed the Russian economy and provided relief to the Putin regime. U.S. financial pressure had hurt Russia, but European trade managed to sustain the country’s economy despite early sanctions. However, with the invasion of Ukraine, European countries massively tightened their pressure campaign, effectively severing most economic ties and barring key exports to Russia. In a drastic move, Western countries froze over $300 billion in Russian foreign exchange reserves, and many European countries began actively diversifying their energy supply. 

After over a year, the most drastic measures were employed, such as the oil price cap and the removal of Russian banks from SWIFT. The former measure targeted Russia’s energy industry by imposing a maximum price on which shipments of Russian oil could be insured, limiting revenues. The latter aimed to sever Russia’s global financial connections by preventing its banks from transmitting funds over a smooth, standard protocol, raising transaction costs. Both tools served to maximize the isolation of the Putin regime from Western markets and cripple the Russian economy’s ability to finance the war in Ukraine. However, five years on, the Kremlin has shifted its strategy to sustain its attempted conquest in the medium term. 

Russian Economic Adaptation 

The immediate impact on the Russian economy was stark, with sharp declines in the Moscow Stock Exchange and immediate downgrading of government bonds, harshly impacting the ruble. Further, in compliance with sanctions, most Western companies exited the Russian market completely, divesting their assets. International energy partnerships involving large, state-owned firms like Rosneft were terminated, and many global companies minimized their involvement in the Russian market. Inflation then spiked throughout 2022, reaching highs of ~13% and exerting significant pressure on Russian civilians’ savings. However, the campaign was insufficient to induce popular revolt, and the regime responded with adaptation tactics by mid-2022. 

Though Western sanctions on Russia had caused economic turmoil and financial difficulties nationwide, Moscow aggressively adapted its economy. Through its amassing of foreign exchange reserves, the Russian Central Bank was able to sustain the economy through fiscal expansion and capital controls. Significant investment went to the defence sector through increased military budgets, while the civilian sector survived on domestic demand and discounted exports to remaining trade partners. Businesses purchased or expropriated from Western companies resumed, often relying on third-country supply chain loopholes to continue operating. Export controls on dual-use goods and other technology products, even in the consumer sector, exacerbated this trend. From a socioeconomic standpoint, the war created a bifurcated growth pattern. Blue-collar wages stabilized and increased with public investment, while Russia’s middle class continued to struggle under economic warfare. As a result, over 800,000 Russians left the country by 2023, citing opposition to the war and economic hardship as their reasons for leaving. 

Sectoral sanctions and price caps impacting the oil sector had managed to choke Russian oil revenues, but adaptation permitted the Kremlin to stabilize them by mid-2022. This was primarily accomplished using a “shadow fleet”, a network of commercial vessels registered outside of Russia that would covertly carry product into sanctioned ports. Tankers would be loaded using ship-to-ship transfers, mixing with non-sanctioned oil, or concealing shipping histories using shell corporations. This method has enabled Russia to evade sanctions and shore up oil revenues for its state-owned producers, bolstering its war coffers. 

On the financial side, Russia began constructing an alternative financial architecture to sustain its private sector. Similarly to Iran, its disconnection from SWIFT resulted in the creation of an alternative financial ecosystem, independent from U.S. and European institutions. Though less efficient, it permitted citizens to continue transacting and foreign buyers to purchase Russian products in rubles rather than US dollars. As European states moved away from Russian oil and imposed a price cap, buyers, including China and India, took advantage of discounted prices and settled transactions in rubles. 

To summarize, though Russia avoided economic collapse since it began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its use of adaptation tactics and sanctions evasion has permitted its economy to remain afloat. Utilizing capital controls, shadow fleets, an alternative financial architecture and intense defence spending, Moscow’s economic policy aims to outlast Western resolve at any cost. However, as losses mount on the battlefield, questions remain as to the willingness of the Russian public to endure continued economic isolation. 

Drone Warfare

The war in Ukraine has dramatically changed how technology is used in warfare, especially how drones and digital systems have transformed the battlefield. Since the start of the war, the Ukrainian government, army, and civilian sector—in both enterprise and volunteer work—have used lessons learned on the battlefield to upgrade drones and improve their use. The country has synergized all three sectors to field, test, and scale drones to the battlefield, incorporating AI tools, robotics, and advanced imagery, including satellite. Whilst it started as improvised operations with mostly commercially available drones, it swiftly moved to bigger or heavily modified commercial drones to adapt to the battlefield. In fact, Ukraine formally institutionalized drones within its armed forces, thereafter creating dedicated specialized units and a doctrine. 

Drones became increasingly used for reconnaissance for artillery strikes, bomb-dropping tactical strikes, and long-range strikes that could reach deeper into Russian territory. As drone warfare took a bigger role in the war, so did electronic warfare (EW). Ukraine developed fibre-optic communications as well as AI-enabled targeting to increase accuracy and autonomy to counter EW. Drones have expanded the kill zone on the battlefield by roughly 20 km and are now responsible for 60 to 70% of casualties on the battlefield. Drones have also improved critical handling of logistics: both aerial and ground drones can deliver ammunition, water, and medical supplies and clear mines. Drones, however, cannot fully replace artillery or infantry, notably because of decreased efficiency in bad weather.  

The increasingly central and pivotal role drones play in the war in Ukraine has led to millions being produced annually, both in Ukraine and imported from allied countries. Ukraine’s push to be innovative and develop technological advancements to gain battlefield advantages aims to offset Russia’s numerical advantage and hinder the Russian armed forces’ progress by hitting logistical lines, entrenched positions, and vulnerable equipment. Ukraine’s Western allies have likewise learned from drone warfare in Ukraine.  

More specifically, there is a reckoning about the future of warfare. Battlefield innovations from Ukraine have sparked interest by nations, namely the E5 (France, Poland, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy), to prepare air defence systems and drone technology, notably with Ukraine, to protect their airspace. The countries want to invest in joint development of drone-based strike capabilities and in low-cost joint procurement of drone effectors and production.  

Ukraine’s use of small drones effectively in the war, in large numbers, even though they are routinely lost for a myriad of reasons. According to military experts, NATO nations and their armies must get used to the concept of losing drones. Low-cost drones, produced en masse, used in large-scale operations, demonstrated an acceptability to losses for Ukraine, though 60 to 80% of its drones fail to reach targets. US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth echoed the need to view drones differently, akin to expendable ammunition. Other lessons from Ukraine are learned. AI tools can be used to accelerate data processing and indeed to enhance image recognition and guidance. Ukraine’s use of commercial satellite communications, navigation, and imagery has proven critical to military capabilities. Ukraine has successfully used software to integrate space capabilities, AI tools, and decision support to improve combat effectiveness by enabling rapid action both on the battlefield and in air defence with layered responses. 

Russia has also used drones in a widespread manner. Since the start of its invasion, the country has increasingly, through time, made use of drones for targeted strikes on cities and civilian infrastructure alongside missiles. Whilst Russian armed forces started using drones as reconnaissance tools, their use moved on to mass attacks, with the notable Shahed-type strike drones Russia purchased from Iran. Those drones were launched during massive attacks to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences. The realities of drone warfare faced by Ukraine are shared with Russia: expansion of kill zones, development and countering of electronic warfare, AI-assisted drones, etc.  

In August 2024, Russia created "Rubicon," the Centre for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, whose mission is to develop, test, and operate advanced drones, robotic systems, and AI integration. Rubicon has targeted Ukrainian supply lines and drone operators behind front lines, disrupted vehicle and infantry movements, and interoperationalized drones to include naval strikes. According to analysts, Russia has learned from the battlefield and innovated in its own regard, and the battlefield itself is one of countermeasures. The effectiveness of Rubicon in coordinating drone operations throughout the battlefield has led some to posit that Ukraine should adopt key elements, such as training pipelines, improve the sharing of frontline experience, and provide additional resources for Ukrainian drone units.  

Although the weather can dramatically affect the efficiency of drones (range, manoeuvrability, and destructive capability), Russia has used the weather and temperature to its advantage while using drones. Russia coordinates with poor weather to decrease the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone-based defences by launching its ground forces forward, whilst Ukrainian drones cannot fly or can fly with poor manoeuvrability. Indeed, Russian armed forces weaponize winter and cold temperatures to target energy infrastructure that plunges Ukrainian cities into the dark, without heat or access to services. Russia’s manufacturing of low-cost drones enables its large-scale missile and drone strikes on Ukraine and has proven strategic in disabling energy infrastructure. By targeting civilian infrastructure and services, Russia weaponizes civilian harm. UN investigations concluded these strikes constitute crimes against humanity.  

The widespread availability of first-person view (FPV) drones, which offer real-time views of targets, in Russian units suggests doctrinal implantation of civilian targeting. The constant and escalated use of drones during the war has cognitive effects, shaping perceptions, morale, and decision-making for both the military and civilians, and it forces Ukraine and Russia to divert resources where limited physical damage would be occasioned by drone strikes.  

Additionally, anti-drone defences such as nets and spiderweb tactics—small, swarming, and networked drones harassing enemy positions—can create a sense of being surrounded, especially as they immobilize troops. The cognitive effect of the involvement and rapid evolution of drones is underscored by how quickly countries have adopted or taken a keen interest in battlefield results of drone operations, notably among European countries. Drone incursions in Poland in September 2025, while small, showcased the permeability of NATO borders and sparked conversations on escalation, deterrence, and protection mechanisms that far outsized the incursions. 

Ukrainian Children 

According to the Canada-Ukraine Foundation, following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, more than 90 Ukrainian children were abducted by Russia and then returned. However, following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian authorities have verified that 19,456 Ukrainian children have been taken to Russia or Russian-occupied territories. International experts estimate the number may exceed 35,000. According to Bring Back Kids UA, 1605 Ukrainian children have been returned. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against President Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s Commissioner for Children’s Rights. The warrants were issued based on reasonable grounds to believe that both are responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and of illegal transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. 

“Ukraine’s Stolen Children: Inside Russia’s Network of Re-Education and Militarization,” by the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale University of Public Health, states that at least 130 of the 200 camps that function to re-educate, Russify, and militarize Ukrainian children have been involved with re-education. The re-education includes efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children with pro-Russia propaganda and disinformation. At least 39 of the camps operate to militarize Ukrainian children as young as 8 years old. These camps put Ukrainian children through weapons training, grenade-throwing competitions, and tactical medicine courses. Ukrainian children are forcibly taken to militarization camps and groomed to fight for Russia. Almost a quarter of the re-education and militarization camps have shown signs of expansion, and at least 2 more camps are under construction. Evidence from incorporated documents indicates that half of the camps are operated directly by the Russian government.  

Testimony given by U.S. Congressman Michael McCaul (R-Texas) states that the Russian Federation delegated $7 billion in its 2026-28 budget for a project titled “youth and children.” An estimated 1 million Ukrainian children live in Russia-occupied territory, and more than 43,000 have enrolled in Russia’s paramilitary youth program. According to McCaul, some of the parents have been threatened to give up their children. Many of the Ukrainian children are sent to fight on the front lines after being Russified, tortured, forced to memorize Russian propaganda and disinformation, and told that Ukraine and their families are “the enemy.” The documentary “Children in the Fire” shows a Ukrainian child taken to a prison where adults use electrodes to inflict torture and conflict-related sexual violence.  

Other ways that Russia has re-educating and indoctrinating Ukrainian children are the forceful adoption of Ukrainian children by Russian families. Russian occupiers in Ukraine’s Luhansk region have created a “catalogue” of Ukrainian children, who are categorized by age, eyes, and hair colour. The Ukrainian children are offered for coerced “adoption” through the education department. The database includes 294 Ukrainian children, and they are advertised for their character traits, such as “obedient” or “calm.” Other descriptors include “polite and respectful towards the adults,” “disciplined,” “not conflictive,” and “can be relied on to execute tasks.” While the Russian-run database describes the children as “orphans and children left without parental care,” Mykola Kuleba, CEO of the Save Ukraine organization, has stated that the majority of the Ukrainian children in this “catalogue” were born in Ukraine’s Luhansk region pre-Russian occupation, the parents of some of them were murdered by occupation authorities, and others were simply issued Russian identification to legitimize their abduction.  

As discussed by Global Affairs Canada, the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children was officially launched in Kyiv, Ukraine, on February 24th, 2024. The Coalition aims to coordinate joint efforts and cooperation between Ukraine and partner states to address the issue of the illegal deportation and forced transfer of Ukrainian children by the Russian Federation. Members of the Coalition include Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the Council of Europe, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, the European Union, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greecy, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in European Parliamentary Assembly, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 

The Government of Ukraine co-chairs the Coalition with the Government of Canada and aims to bring Ukrainian children home to their families and communities, as well as to reunification. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy co-chaired a leader-level meeting of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian children before the beginning of the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly. Ukraine and Canada aim to achieve the goal of bringing Ukrainian children by coordinating joint efforts; sharing information; synchronizing capabilities, expertise, and financial resources of Ukraine and its partners; and advocating and communicating to raise awareness of the issue. Canada’s role in the initiative includes providing practical expertise from Canadian officials; the #BringBackKids Communications Network; and, during the Summit on Peace in Ukraine, Canada announced a package to support vulnerable children, youth at risk, and the reintegration of displaced children returning to Ukraine by improving child protective services and family-based care options, and also increasing the awareness regarding the missing persons process.  

Other War Crimes 

The risk of gender-based violence (GBV) has significantly increased in Ukraine since Russia’s 2022 invasion. Due to economic instability, displacement, the deterioration of the security situation, and the impact on the mental health of the Ukrainian population, Ukrainian women and girls are at a heightened risk of GBV. GBV includes intimate partner violence, human trafficking, harassment, sexual exploitation and abuse, and conflict-related sexual violence. Lyudmila, a caseworker with the UNHCR partner “Nehemiah,” discussed the complexities of stereotypes and patriarchal traditions, which, in some cases, deter individuals from seeking help to avoid giving their family a bad reputation. She discussed how individuals rely on what their neighbours think and say, so it is common to create the image of a perfect family. Lyudmila further discussed cases in which mothers have told their daughters to endure hardships in marriage because it is their duty as wives. To prevent GBV and mitigate risk, UNHCR and its partners have implemented survivor-centred case management, capacity-building for local organizations, and targeted interventions to reduce the risk of GBV in collective sites hosting internally displaced people.  

Since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and illegal occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014, the Kremlin has weaponized war crimes such as conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). The Kremlin has not only weaponized CRSV on the battlefield, but has also used CRSV against prisoners of war and citizens in occupied territory. As of June 2025, the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine has confirmed 366 cases of CRSV, which affected 231 women, 134 men, and 19 children.  Evidence from international monitoring mechanisms, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and fact-finding reports under the OSCE framework, has provided extensive evidence regarding a systematic nature of CRSV by Russia. 

According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights report, Russian authorities have subjected not only prisoners of war but also detained Ukrainian civilians in occupied territory to torture and ill-treatment. Including cases of CRSV discussed earlier, there have also been cases of severe beatings and electric shock, mock executions, summary executions, prolonged stress positions, and threats of violence and death to them or their loved ones. There have also been reports of poor detention conditions, including a lack of food and medical treatment. There have also been widespread and systematic enforced disappearances of Ukrainian civilians in Russian captivity. The victims of enforced disappearances include local authorities, civil servants, journalists, and others perceived as a threat to the Russian occupation authorities. These Ukrainian citizens were transferred to detention facilities in Russian-occupied areas in Ukraine or deported to the Russian Federation. Many Ukrainian citizens have been missing for months or years, have been subjected to torture and CRSV, and some have died.  

There have also been an increasing number of incidents where Russian armed forces killed or wounded Ukrainian prisoners of war, and deserted Russian soldiers have said that they were ordered to kill rather than capture Ukrainian soldiers. It was also found that both Ukraine and Russia have used drones to wound or visibly kill injured soldiers who could no longer defend themselves. Deserted Russian soldiers have also explained how Russian soldiers have been executed by their commanders for not following commands. Other stories include how other Russian soldiers who refused to go to the front line were electrocuted, tortured, urinated on, starved, and forced into “meat storms” while unarmed.  

Ukraine has also detained its own citizens on charges related to national security, such as treason and espionage. Many of these cases involve charges of collaboration with Russian occupiers. Ukrainian citizens have been prosecuted for carrying out emergency services, construction, humanitarian relief, and garbage removal during Russian occupation. Such activities, the Russian occupying authorities can lawfully compel. Around 2,258 Ukrainian citizens held by Ukraine are in official pre-trial and penal facilities as of July 21st, 2025. There are also 20,000 open cases, which have strained Ukraine’s criminal justice system. Ukrainian authorities have taken steps to strengthen the procedural safeguards and improve detention conditions. It is essential to note that Ukraine’s judicial system was under reform before Russia’s 2022 invasion; however, the lack of personnel has made judicial reform more difficult. The UN Human Rights Office continues to document cases of torture and ill-treatment of detainees, but accountability is lacking. 

Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia has attacked civilian infrastructure, including apartment buildings, homes, schools, hospitals, and other buildings that provide essential services. The indiscriminate and disproportionate bombing and shelling of civilian areas has led to older persons being particularly affected near the front line due to the lack of essential services. Russia’s increase in the usage of long-range weapons also correlated with the increase in harm to Ukrainian urban centres. In 2025, conflict-related violence killed 2,514 Ukrainian civilians and injured 12,142, 31% higher than in 2024 and 70% higher than in 2023. Ukrainian civilian casualties caused by drones have increased by 120%, resulting in the deaths of 577 civilians and 3,288 injuries.  

Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federation has been looting and erasing Ukrainian culture. This has included the looting of Ukrainian museums and the appropriation of Ukrainian history. This has led to the erasing of Ukrainian history, national majorities, and the Indigenous peoples of Ukraine. Russian forces have been accused of deliberately bombing culturally significant sites, including heritage buildings and museums. According to Ukrainian authorities, 2,024 cultural institutions have been damaged, and 334 (16.5%) of Ukraine’s cultural facilities have been destroyed. This has included the historic centre of Lviv, seven cultural monument buildings, and the 19th-century Huliaipole Local History Museum. Ukrainian authorities have stated that the Kremlin established a “network” to transfer thousands of museum objects to Russian territory. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian artifacts are believed to have been looted from over 40 museums in occupied territory.  

Internal and External Displacement

According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, 3.7 million Ukrainian civilians have been internally displaced, 5.9 million Ukrainian refugees have been reported globally, and approximately 10.8 million Ukrainians are in need of humanitarian assistance. According to the World Health Organization, there has been a significant decline in the health and wellness of Ukrainians, including mental health, in comparison to the pre-war period. Vulnerable groups, such as older people and people with disabilities, may be unable to flee from high-risk areas close to the front line. Other vulnerable groups, such as women and children, who are at risk of GBV and CRSV, make up 76% of Ukrainian refugees. Many Ukrainian refugees, especially Ukrainian women and girls, deal with challenges including psychological distress, physical risks, and economic hardship. Another vulnerable group, being Ukrainian LGBTQIA+ individuals, have faced discrimination in countries such as Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Specifically, for Ukrainian transgender refugees, their gender identity is often questioned at border crossings, especially if their documentation does not fit their gender identity. Often, once they reach their destination, Ukrainian transgender refugees often struggle to access health care such as hormone replacement therapy.