By: Liam Nohr, Research Analyst
Executive Summary
The 2025 G7 Summit, held in Kananaskis, Alberta, convened amid a backdrop of escalating global volatility, ranging from the wars in Ukraine and Gaza to economic disruption and technological competition. This policy note analyzes how the G7 adapted its institutional practices to address strategic challenges through six joint statements, each focused on discrete issues, such as AI governance, quantum technologies, and critical minerals. It explores the summit’s shift from a single communiqué model to a fragmented yet issue-specific consensus structure and examines the evolving role of the G7 as it balances geopolitical cooperation and competition. The note also considers how the G7 is reframing security through both traditional and non-traditional lenses, and how resilience—digital, environmental, and institutional—has emerged as a central organizing concept. Finally, it identifies key omissions from the summit’s public outputs, including positions on Ukraine, climate change, and Gaza, as indicators of the limits of consensus within an increasingly contested global order.
Background on the G7
The Group of Seven, comprising Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and more recently the EU, come together annually to discuss the most timely and daunting issues affecting the global system. Created in 1975 as a platform for non-communist powers, the Group of Seven (G7) positions itself as a collective decision-making body of like-minded actors committed to upholding democratic norms, economic stability, and international security. The presidency of the G7 rotates annually among its members, with the presiding nation hosting the summit and setting its agenda. This year, Canada holds the G7 presidency and convened the summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, the second time the mountain town has hosted the gathering, following the 2002 Summit. Nestled deep in the Rocky Mountains, the meeting took place amid two ongoing regional conflicts—one in Ukraine, the other in Gaza—a violent escalation between Israel and Iran, and a broader disruption and reorientation of the global trading system. Alliance management, economic coordination, and concerns surrounding institutional legitimacy in a fragmenting global order fell on Canada’s presidency of the G7 this year.
The G7 in Today’s Geopolitical Context
What distinguishes the 2025 Summit from its predecessors, however, is the central role of relationship-building, a dynamic that increasingly supersedes formal agenda-setting.i In the lead-up to the summit, several G7 member states, and invited non-member states, found themselves embroiled in trade disputes with one another, and used the forum as a space to attempt informal resolution and strategic recalibration. Differing approaches to leadership and participation in ongoing conflicts, particularly in Ukraine and the Middle East, have revealed underlying geopolitical and strategic tensions, most notably between the United States and key European partners. Disagreements over military aid coordination, diplomatic messaging, and the scope of regional engagement have made unity more difficult to sustain, even as G7 leaders continue to project a united front.ii
The agenda reflected the G7’s attempt to remain adaptable in an increasingly contested global order. Typically, G7 Summits conclude with a single joint communiqué, a consensus document reflecting the unified position of member states on a variety of issues. This communiqué not only outlines shared policy objectives but also serves a symbolic function: it projects an air of cohesion, legitimacy, and strategic intent to domestic and international audiences alike. This year, the group issued six separate joint statements, each seeking to articulate a consensus-based position on a narrow theme. The seven joint statements were:
Developments Between Israel and Iran
AI Prosperity
Quantum Technologies
Countering Migrant Smuggling
Transnational Repression
Critical Minerals Action Plan
Kananaskis Wildfire Charter
This policy note aims to synthesize the major themes and strategic priorities that emerged from the 2025 G7 Summit in Kananaskis. It situates the summit within today’s shifting geopolitical landscape and analyzes how the G7 endeavors to strike a balance between cooperation and competition across key domains. The following sections examine the summit’s geopolitical context, thematic focus areas, evolving security agenda, and notable omissions.
AI: Collaboration vs Competition
Nowhere was the tension between collaboration and competition more apparent at the 2025 G7 Summit than in the domain of artificial intelligence (AI).iii With the rapid proliferation of increasingly sophisticated AI systems, including large-scale foundation models and tools with potential military or civilian applications, many observers have warned of an accelerating AI arms race in which states prioritize technological supremacy over safety, ethics, and equitable access. This framing has been reinforced by the policies of authoritarian rivals, particularly China and Russia, who have leveraged AI to bolster surveillance regimes, conduct influence operations, and shape digital norms that conflict with liberal democratic values.iv
The G7’s joint statement titled “AI for Prosperity”, by contrast, offered an alternative governance model, one rooted in multilateral cooperation, regulatory harmonization, and shared ethical commitments. The formation of the G7 AI Network (GAIN) was a cornerstone of this approach. Announced during the summit as part of the G7’s policy track, GAIN builds on earlier G7 commitments to responsible AI by providing a formal mechanism to coordinate policy, pool technical expertise, and pilot cross-border regulatory approaches. Designed to democratize access to AI expertise through knowledge-sharing, regulatory experimentation, and standard-setting, this initiative reflects a strategic wager: that the long-term legitimacy and stability of the international system depend not on dominating the digital frontier, but on building inclusive and interoperable governance mechanisms.v vi
While the G7 collectively endorsed openness and transparency, individual member states remain locked in domestic debates over industrial strategy, data protection, and AI regulation. The EU’s Artificial Intelligence Act, passed in 2024, imposes stringent requirements on high-risk systems, while the US continues to favour a more innovation-friendly, decentralized regulatory environment. These divergences complicate the realization of a unified G7 approach, raising questions about the enforceability of joint principles. Moreover, scholars have previously criticized the G7 for failing to establish meaningful accountability measures for private-sector actors, particularly large language model developers, whose influence on information ecosystems and democratic processes is growing rapidly, a trend that is difficult to address due to the decentralized nature of global AI governance.vii
Beyond internal coherence, the G7’s cooperative vision also faces external pressure. China’s Digital Silk Road and AI capacity-building efforts in the Global South offer a stark counter-model, one that couples infrastructure investment with political conditionality and data access.viii In this context, G7 efforts to promote open access and ethical design are not only normative declarations, but geopolitical maneuvers that attempt to shape the digital order to embed liberal democratic values and pre-empt authoritarian influence in the AI digital space. As Ben Jensen from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) notes, “It is about strategic competition—and whether free societies will define the AI century or cede it to authoritarian regimes that view knowledge as power and power as control”.ix The stakes are further heightened by the infrastructural demands of next-generation AI systems. As models become larger and more computationally intensive, control over cloud resources, computing capacity, and energy inputs is becoming a new axis of strategic advantage. The G7’s commitment to AI-ready energy grids, along with collaborative forecasting tools, reflects an understanding that AI is no longer just a software issue but a matter of digital and ecological infrastructure. Without robust coordination, the rush to scale AI risks producing fragmented ecosystems, grid failures, and environmental strain.
Ultimately, the G7’s collaborative framing of AI governance seeks to position liberal democracies as rule-makers in a contested technological landscape. Yet, whether this approach can withstand the competitive pressures of realpolitik remains uncertain. The challenge is not only to outperform the innovation ecosystems established by authoritarian competitors, but to prove that inclusive, rights-based governance can deliver both security and prosperity in a rapidly evolving digital world. The summit’s AI initiatives thus serve as a litmus test for the G7’s strategic coherence and the viability of democratic multilateralism in shaping the global technological order.
AI and Quantum: Strategic Resilience
As geopolitical and environmental shocks become more frequent, the G7 has increasingly prioritized the need for strategic resilience amid systemic disruptions. With the 2025 Summit, this concept now lies at the heart of the G7’s broader reorientation from reactive crisis management to forward-looking governance.x In this context, strategic resilience is as much about institutions and values as it is about critical minerals and AI-ready energy grids. The G7 seeks to embed resilience at multiple levels of government decision-making—economic, environmental, and democratic—while maintaining a strategic edge in an increasingly contested international system.
Canada’s leadership on critical minerals was central to this agenda. In her testimony to the Senate Finance Committee, Dr. Gracelin Baskaran states that “critical minerals are no longer just a matter of commerce; they are the backbone of future economies and national security, making the diversification of supply chains a strategic imperative,” especially as China consolidates its control over rare earth extraction and processing.xi The Chinese state currently accounts for 60% of global rare earth production and dominates the battery industry, with its refining activities accounting for 73% of the world’s total for cobalt, 59% for lithium and 68% for nickel.xii The G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan exemplifies a strategic approach, as G7 members agreed to diversify and onshore parts of the value chain, invest in circular economy practices, and develop a standards-based minerals market with a traceability roadmap to counter China’s rise in the industry. The goal is not only to secure inputs for green and digital industries, but also to partner with emerging economies in a mutually beneficial manner, emblematized by invites to key leaders from the Global South.
Digital resilience emerged as a strategic priority at the 2025 Summit, reflecting a growing recognition that digital infrastructure now forms the backbone of both economic stability and democratic durability. As generative AI systems rapidly scale and quantum breakthroughs edge closer to operational reality, the risks to energy grids, communication systems, and data sovereignty have become increasingly pronounced. The AI and Energy Workplan directly addressed these vulnerabilities and cautioned that, if left unregulated, the computational demands of frontier models could overwhelm electricity networks. To mitigate these threats, G7 leaders committed to deploying AI-based forecasting tools, optimizing grid efficiency, and embedding sustainability into large-scale model development. As Professor Seng and Wang caution, “Infrastructure demands will diverge significantly as AI systems become more complex... governance frameworks must be flexible enough to accommodate these variations without compromising sustainability goals,” especially in regions facing climate shocks or energy transition bottlenecks.xiii This is not merely a technical concern, but a geopolitical one: control over energy-AI interoperability could determine which countries’ models scale safely and equitably—and which do not.
In parallel, the Quantum Statement reflected rising concern over encryption risk and digital sovereignty. The G7 committed to fast-tracking post-quantum cryptographic protocols and coordinating research on secure R&D environments. These commitments are a response to what OECD analysts describe as a “policy lag” between technological innovation and the institutions meant to govern its use. As Jen Sovada, former US Air Force cyber officer and OECD quantum expert, puts it: “Quantum computing’s ability to break public key encryption isn’t just a future threat—it demands coordinated response strategies now.”xiv These efforts also signal the G7’s determination to define rules and norms for dual-use technologies—those with civilian and military purposes—before authoritarian rivals do. China’s rapid scaling of its Digital Silk Road and Russia’s use of cyber warfare to target critical infrastructure present asymmetric threats that bypass conventional defence systems. By integrating cyber standards with democratic values—through initiatives like GAIN, open data partnerships, and AI ethics blueprints—the G7 aims to embed digital trust as a first-order security priority. In this framework, digital resilience is more than an operational necessity; it is a strategic frontier for securing the future of open societies. Operationalizing these commitments will require durable political will and the effective management of domestic and external pressures to scale at speed.
Soft Power and Hard Security
The 2025 G7 Summit marked a significant expansion in how security is conceptualized and operationalized among liberal democracies. No longer confined to conventional defence postures or military deterrence, the G7 now treats security as a layered, cross-cutting concern, encompassing everything from digital sovereignty to population displacement and environmental degradation. This evolution reflects both the nature of 21st-century threats and the asymmetries exploited by authoritarian regimes. Hybrid tactics, including disinformation, cyber sabotage, and the weaponization of migration, now threaten domestic stability and international order alike. In response, the G7’s 2025 agenda challenged traditional boundaries between “hard” security—defined as the protection of states through military force, deterrence, and defence alliances—and “soft” security, which addresses non-military risks through cooperative, regulatory, and resilience-building mechanisms. Together, these were recast as complementary requirements for safeguarding open societies through both kinetic defence and systemic resilience.
Hard Security
Transnational repression emerged as a defining hard security concern at the 2025 G7 Summit, reflecting the growing reach of authoritarian regimes into the domestic spaces of liberal democracies. The Leaders’ Statement on Transnational Repression identified tactics such as spyware surveillance, cross-border intimidation, digital harassment, and the abuse of legal systems as strategic threats to sovereignty and democratic stability. These acts, often facilitated by commercial spyware and transnational networks, are no longer limited to the national boundaries of authoritarian states. Instead, they now operate across borders with impunity. Research by the Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, has shown how dissidents in Canada and abroad have been targeted by spyware sold by private firms to authoritarian states, including the 2018 case of Omar Abdulaziz, a close associate of Jamal Khashoggi. Khashoggi, a prominent Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist, was assassinated for his outspoken criticism of the Saudi regime; activism undertaken by Abdulaziz, a Saudi dissident based in Canada, has made him a target of transnational repression. These cases underscore how state-directed surveillance technologies can extend media repression beyond national borders. The Lab has also documented domestic inconsistencies—the use of similar surveillance tools by Canadian law enforcement agencies, for example. The gap between international commitment and national practice underscores the complexity of confronting transnational repression in a digital age.
This complexity is compounded by the findings of No Way In or Out, a 2024 report from Freedom House. The report identifies how authoritarian states increasingly rely on non-violent forms of coercion, such as passport cancellations, denial of consular services, and travel bans, to restrict the movement and agency of exiled dissidents. These tactics form part of a broader strategy of “mobility control,” which operates through the manipulation of border regimes, migration systems, and international law enforcement tools. Freedom House warns that even democratic states can become unwitting enablers of such repression, especially when they engage in broad security cooperation or permit opaque uses of migration and policing infrastructure.xv In this context, the G7’s framing of transnational repression as a hard security issue marks a conceptual shift from viewing such acts as isolated abuses to recognizing them as systemic, coordinated, and strategically consequential. As the geopolitical contest between open and authoritarian systems intensifies, transnational repression becomes a form of hybrid warfare that bypasses traditional borders and challenges G7 principles.
Migrant smuggling figured prominently in the G7’s hard security discourse, particularly in its interactions with hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare. The 2025 joint statement reaffirmed the group’s 2024 Action Plan, with new emphasis on financial tracking, sanctions, and cross-sectoral collaboration to dismantle transnational smuggling networks. G7 leaders explicitly recognized that irregular migration may be instrumentalized by hostile actors to overwhelm national borders or fracture political cohesion. This framing reflects the findings of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants, which estimated that smuggling along major global corridors, such as Africa to Europe and South and Central America to North America, generates up to US$7 billion per year for criminal networks.xvi These operations exploit governance gaps, conflict zones, and legal ambiguity to create a sprawling infrastructure of coercion and profit.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Missing Migrants Project offers a glimpse into the human cost of this economic calculus. In 2022 alone, over 50,000 migrant deaths were recorded globally, with the Mediterranean Sea, Central America, and North Africa among the deadliest transit regions. Most of these deaths occurred in contexts of irregular migration, often facilitated by smugglers operating with impunity. Many of the deceased remain unidentified and their families unnotified, compounding the humanitarian toll of what is often framed as a security issue. The G7’s reframing of migrant smuggling, from a narrow law enforcement problem to a sprawling strategic and moral challenge, acknowledges and seeks to address this trellis of profit, risk, and policy inertia. By spotlighting smuggling at the summit, the G7 signaled its intent to approach migration not only as a governance issue, but as a geopolitical battleground of government legitimacy, human rights, and state capacity.
Soft Power
While conventional security threats dominated earlier G7 communiqués, the 2025 Summit broadened the definition of security to include societal trust, institutional legitimacy, and environmental resilience, elements increasingly seen as foundational to democratic stability. The AI for Prosperity framework positioned responsible artificial intelligence development not just as a technological priority, but as a matter of public trust. G7 leaders emphasized that without meaningful digital literacy, ethical guardrails, and equitable deployment, AI may exacerbate inequality and erode democratic norms. This reflects findings from the OECD, which warns that “misaligned incentives and lack of inclusive AI governance risk deepening digital divides and social polarization.” A 2024 OECD survey found that only 41% of citizens across G7 countries trust their leaders to govern AI effectively.xvii
To address these risks, the G7 launched initiatives such as the AI Adoption Blueprint and the G7 AI Network (GAIN), aimed at expanding AI literacy, regulatory alignment, and inclusive capacity-building, especially in the Global South. These programs frame digital governance not merely as a regulatory space, but as a tool of civic empowerment. Similarly, the Quantum Technologies statement emphasized the importance of ethical pre-emption. With quantum computing poised to upend encryption and information security, G7 leaders committed to developing shared governance principles in order to keep authoritarian states from defining “the norms of the next frontier”.xviii
Climate resilience was also reframed as a core soft security concern, especially through the Kananaskis Wildfire Charter. The Charter took an expansive view of environmental policy, addressing the cascading effects of climate-driven disasters on public health, social cohesion, and institutional capacity. In 2023, Canada experienced its worst wildfire season on record, with over 18 million hectares burned, nearly twice the size of Portugal, and $9.1 billion in insured damages.xix These events triggered mass evacuations and cross-border air quality crises, underscoring the transnational consequences of climate instability. The Charter calls for Indigenous land stewardship, interoperable response systems, and whole-of-society resilience, integrating environmental governance into the G7’s democratic security framework.
Notable Omissions
Ukraine-Russia War
The most glaring omission from the agenda was the absence of a unified, G7 position on the Ukraine–Russia war. Now entering its fourth year, the war has shaped the contemporary global security environment and had featured prominently in previous G7 communiqués. Earlier in March 2025, the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statement had reaffirmed unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and warned of further sanctions unless Russia agreed to a ceasefire. Yet at the leaders’ summit itself, no standalone statement was issued on Ukraine, nor were new joint military, financial, or humanitarian commitments publicly announced, other than Canada’s $2-billion military assistance package.xx Since Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union, 337 commitments and 80 decisions have been agreed upon by the G7, with a substantial uptick in the years immediately following Russia’s full-scale invasion.xxi This silence is striking given the continued intensity of the conflict, the ongoing call for allied coordination, and the precedent set by the 2022–2024 G7 Summits, which centered Ukraine as a core agenda item. The absence suggests either a strategic decision to handle support bilaterally or behind closed doors or growing divergence among G7 members on the long-term trajectory of the war.
Climate Change
Though wildfire prevention was top of mind during the summit, concrete announcements regarding the broader issue of climate change failed to make the final cut. A month before the summit, finance ministers of the G7 countries produced a communiqué that, for the first time since 2019, did not include a set of actions to combat climate change. This was, as Canadian Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne put it, a “back to basics” approach with the aim of fostering unity among G7 members.xxii Patricia Fuller, CEO of the Canadian think tank International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) points out that “The G7 sidestepped climate change in the leaders’ statements, despite acknowledging increased wildfires”.xxiii Though critical mineral development, a central component to enabling a clean transition, was touted by many experts as a positive outcome of the G7, activists have expressed their concern regarding the summit’s inattention to the root causes of climate change.xxiv
Gaza
Despite the prominence of the Israel-Gaza conflict in global headlines and its escalation in the months preceding the summit, the 2025 G7 Summit addressed the issue only in passing. Gaza appeared briefly in the Leader’s Statement on Recent Developments Between Israel and Iran, which emphasized Israel’s security and Iran’s destabilizing role while arguing that the resolution of the Iranian crisis would “lead to a broader de-escalation of hostilities in the Middle East, including a ceasefire in Gaza”.xxv This limited reference falls short of a comprehensive joint position on Gaza itself. The omission of a more robust stance is notable given the scale of the humanitarian crisis, the regional implications of continued hostilities, and the diplomatic strain it has placed on relations between G7 members and key actors in the Middle East. Analysts suggest that divergences in member states’ positions, concerns over message unity, and the risk of undermining diplomatic engagements with regional partners may have contributed to this cautious treatment.xxvi
Conclusion
The 2025 G7 Summit in Kananaskis revealed both the promises and the pressures facing this informal bloc of democracies. In an era defined by increasing fragmentation, the Summit opted for depth over breadth, eschewing a single communiqué in favour of focused joint statements where consensus could be clearly articulated. Through its emphasis on technological cooperation, strategic resource governance, and democratic resilience, the G7 repositioned itself as an economic forum grappling with the institutional and infrastructural challenges of a multipolar world rather than casting itself in the mold of a normative alliance. Yet the numerous omissions—on Ukraine, Gaza, and climate change—signal the fragility of that cohesion and the hard limits of like-minded governance. In an era that blurs the line between collaboration and competition, where security is as much about values as it is about arms, and where resilience must be both material and moral, the G7’s future credibility will depend not only on what it agrees to, but what it dares to confront next.
Notes
i Findlay, Martha H. and John Kirton. “The good old-fashioned reason that the G7 still matters,” June 18, 2025. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-why-g7-summit-still-matters/.
ii Kirton, John. “Promising prospects for a productive Kananaskis Summit.” G7 Canada: The Kananaskis Summit 2025. 2025, 21.
iii Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), “G7 Leaders’ Statement on AI for Prosperity,” (Canada: 2025) (hereafter AIFP).
iv Meacham, Sam. “A Race to Extinction: How Great Power Competition Is Making Artificial Intelligence Existentially Dangerous.” Harvard International Review, September 8, 2023. https://hir.harvard.edu/a-race-to-extinction-how-great-power-competition-is-making-artificial-intelligence-existentially-dangerous/.
v PMO, AIFP, 1.
vi Jonas Tallberg, Eva Erman, Maruis Ferndal, Johannes Geith and Mark Klamberg, “The Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence: Next Steps for Empirical and Normative Research,” International Studies Review 25 (2023): 1-23.
vii James Griffiths, “China’s Digital Silk Road,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 17, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/china-digital-silk-road/.
viii Benjamin Jensen, “Protecting Our Edge: Trade Secrets and the Global AI Arms Race,” CSIS, May 7, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/protecting-our-edge-trade-secrets-and-global-ai-arms-race.
ix PMO, AIFP, 1.
x Gracelin Baskaran, A Strategy for Minerals Diplomacy in Emerging Markets (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025), 4.
xi Vina Nadjibulla and Xiaoting (Maya) Liu, “How Escalating U.S.–China Competition Over Critical Minerals Impacts Canada,” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, March 19, 2025.
xii Lee Poh Seng and Heng Wang, “Greening Intelligence: Why AI Infrastructure and Governance Must Evolve Together,” World Economic Forum, May 12, 2025, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/05/why-ai-infrastructure-and-governance-must-evolve-together/.
xiii OECD, A Quantum Technologies Policy Primer, OECD Digital Economy Papers No. 371 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2025), https://www.oecd.org/sti/quantum-technologies-policy-primer.pdf.
xiv Freedom House, No Way In or Out: Authoritarian Controls on the Freedom of Movement, by Amy Slipowitz, Jessica White, and Yana Gorokhovskaia (Washington, DC: Freedom House, August 2024), 14. https://freedomhouse.org.
xv United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018 (Vienna: United Nations, 2018), 13, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glosom/GLOSOM_2018_web_small.pdf.
xvi OECD, AQTPP.
xvii Alexander H. Montgomery and Amy J. Nelson, The Rise of the Futurists: The Perils of Predicting with Futurethink (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, November 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-rise-of-the-futurists-the-perils-of-predicting-with-futurethink/.
xviii CBC, “Five charts to help understand Canada’s record-breaking wildfire season,” October 2023. https://www.cbc.ca/news/climate/wildfire-season-2023-wrap-1.6999005.
xix Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Minister Anand announces major additional sanctions in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (Ottawa: Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2025), available at https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2025/06/minister-anand-announces-major-additional-sanctions-in-relation-to-russias-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine.html.
xx Mason, Zoe. “G7 performance on Ukraine.” G7 Canada: The Kananaskis Summit 2025. 2025, 24.
xxi Radio-Canada International, “G7 Finance Ministers Show Proof of Unity with Joint Statement at Summit,” June 2025. https://ici.radio-canada.ca/rci/en/news/2166725/g7-finance-ministers-show-proof-of-unity-with-joint-statement-at-summit-champagne.
xxii International Institute for Sustainable Development. “G7 Statements Omit References to Climate Change Amidst Increasing Wildfires.” Statement, June 17, 2025. https://www.iisd.org/articles/statement/g7-omits-climate-change.
xxiii Aude Darnal, Pía Marchegiani, Hunter Slingbaum, Guillaume Soto-Mayor, and Fabby Tumiwa, ”CriticalMinerals: The Not-So-Green Side of the Green Transition” Stimson Center, November 29, 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/critical-minerals-the-not-so-green-side-of-the-green-transition/.
xxiv G7 Leaders. “G7 Leaders’ Statement on Recent Developments Between Israel and Iran.” June 16, 2025. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/06/16/g7-leaders-statement-on-recent-developments-between-israel-and-iran.
xxv Atlantic Council. “What Did Not Happen at the G7 Summit in Canada—And Why It Matters.” June 19, 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-did-not-happen-at-the-g7-summit-in-canada-and-why-it-matters/.